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I. Introduction
Barter is the oldest form of trade. The payment for goods with goods
predates the invention of money and is still with us today. This paper has
two purposes: first, to expose the student of international business to this
form of trade between nations; and second, to contradict the sentiments ex-
pressed in this quotation:
"It is difficult for Americans, so committed to free trade,
to understand the logic behind trade without money. Per-
haps there is no 'logic,' at least in terms of traditional
Western economic theory. Maybe the-re are only reasons that
few Americans can understand and even fewer can accept. "'
In this section we summarily review the nature of 'trade without money' and
its recent history. Section II examines the various modes of barter in some
detail, focusing on the common provisions and pitfalls of such transactions.
Section III discusses two proximate causes for barter, price distortions and
the need for liquidity, and two benefits, improvement in the terms of trade
and the creation of long-term contracts and trading relationships. Section
IV concerns itself with the political-economy of barter, that is, the reasons
behind the proximate causes. The aim here is to show that barter is a conse-
quence of several different 'logics' depending on the countries involved. The
section assesses the future of barter based on these disparate origins and
argues that only in the case of the East Bloc's trade can one expect barter
to grow in importance over time.
Barter is a highly inflexible form of trade. It requires that both parties
to the transaction each want the other's products, and at the same time. Money,
on the other hand, serves as a medium of exchange and as a store of value. The
exchange of goods for money (monetary trade) therefore removes the two sources
of rigidity in barter. Trade can be multilateral and spread over time rather
than having to be bilateral and instantaneous.
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A seller accepts money because he knows he can use it to purchase goods
he does want, even if he must buy them from some third party. Since it has
value, the seller does not have to convert it into goods immediately, but can,
instead, store it for use at some later date. Basically, it is more efficient
for all traders to agree to accept in exchange some "store of value" commodity
that is cheap to produce, store, transfer, and is not eroded by consumption.
Money, especially in the form of bank deposits, meets these criteria. For bar-
ter to flourish, there must be some reason that monetary trade is not possible,
or perhaps not desired.
Despite the advantage of monetary trade, countries and firms do engage in
barter. Barter thrives at times of inflation, slump, or uncertainty. The des-
truction of most trading nations' foreign reserves after World War I led to the
upsurge of barter trade in the 1920' s. In the 1930' s. Hitler's finance minister,
Hjalmar Schacht, accomplished the growth of Germany's economy despite the de-
pression through barter deals. After World War II, most of the European cur-
rencies. East and West, were inconvertible. During this period, the U.S. acted
as the world's "banker" by running balance of payment deficits which enabled
the nations of Western Europe to use dollars in their international trade. Even
so, these countries did not return to convertibility until 1958, and in the mean-
time negotiated hundreds of bilateral clearing agreement with each other. The
East Bloc (KB) was less able, partially because of the Cold War, to generate
and use dollars. The U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European countries relied instead
on clearing agreements among themselves and with Western Europe. Later, they
extended this mechanism to their trade with other countries with inconvertible
currencies, especially the LDC's.
The OPEC oil-price rise in 1973 led many European countries to exchange
manufactured goods, nuclear power stations, and military hardware for oil.
Barter does not, of course, have to be international. In 1974, the U.S. Federal
!1
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Trade Commission claimed that barter was becoming a standard way for many of
the country's largest corporations to obtain products that were otherwise
scarce. This is particularly true in the steel and chemical industries where
the big companies swap their stockpiles of raw materials between themselves,
as required, to smooth out any shortages.
Individuals also commonly engage in barter. For example, there are re-
ports that as income taxes rise, individuals are exchanging services in order
to reduce their money income. Thus doctors will exchange medical care for
plumbing, or accountants, bookkeeping for wills. However, we will restrict
our discussion to barter in international trade.
Of the Western countries. West Germany is the biggest barterer because of
its substantial trade volume with Communist countries. U.S. companies, long
accustomed to straight cash deals, are being dragged very reluctantly into bar-
ter agreements. The Soviet Union and the East Bloc are quite committed to this
form of trade and companies wishing to do business with them are finding that
they must adjust. Barter is estimated to account for 15-207o of all East-West
2
trade, and the figure could be as high as 40%. In addition, many developing
countries are turning to barter in their trade with the developed countries.
Barter already accounts for some 60% of the trade between the LDCs and Russia
3
and Eastern Europe. While today, the Peoples' Republic of China conducts most
of its trade with the developed countries in hard currency, it too relies al-
most exclusively on barter for its trade with developing countries.
Barter trade has given rise to a number of firms, primarily in Europe,
that specialize in arranging and negotiating such arrangements either on their
own account or on behalf of Western firms selling to the East Bloc and the LDCs,
and in disposing of the goods acquired. These firms are known by many names,
such as intermerchants, barter-switch houses, or compensation traders, but all
perform substantially the same services. Certain large manufacturing firms,
such as Siemens and Douglas Aircraft have established in-housc barter depart-
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ments to service their own requirements. A number of European banks also
have departments or subsidiaries with expertise in this area.
Western firms usually do not know of the marketability of the barter
goods offered as compensation. The barter specialist can advise which goods
are likely to be offered, which are most saleable, and what price concessions
will have to be offered to buyers in order to sell the goods on world markets.
Frequently, companies will engage a barter house to negotiate the trade, buy
the products at established prices, and/or do the final marketing. The barter
specialists' fee will vary with the countries and commodities involved and the
amount of time the firm is willing to allow for marketing the goods.
In the East Bloc countries (EBCs), Foreign Trade Organizations (FTOs)
perform some of the same functions as the barter specialists. These organiza-
tions carry out all foreign trade. They act as intermediaries between domestic
enterprises and foreign firms, negotiating both convential trade and barter
and gathering market intelligence. Many LDCs have similar organizations, or
assign these responsibilities to the Ministry of Trade or Finance.
II. Modes of Barter
The general term "barter trade" comprises a number of different types of
transactions. These are: (1) pure, partial, and local-currency barter, and
compensation trade; (2) clearing agreements, switch, and aller/retour ; and
(3) product buy-back, co-production, and barter for services. Barter traders
use many of these terms, though in practice frequently interchangeably and im-
precisely. The modes are grouped to bring out some commonalities between them
and will be discussed in much greater detail shortly.
The first group represents the exchange of goods. The distinctions re-
flect operational differences in the degree of monetarization of trade and the
currencies used. These types of barter are common in East-West trade, among
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the Less Developed Countries (LDCs), and between LDCs and the developed coun-
tries of the West.
Clearing agreements provide liquidity and credit to countries with incon-
vertible currencies. Switch and aller/retour have developed as a bridge bet-
ween the agreements and international markets. Clearing agreements are very
common among East Bloc Countries (EBCs) and between EBCs and LDCs.
The last group represents barter for intangibles. Product buy-back and
co-production both have a component of technology transfer paid for in goods.
Barter for services refers to the exchange of marketing services for products.
The first two modes in this group occur almost exclusively in East-West trade.
The third is an aspect of most barters.
As was pointed out in the previous section, pure barter is very inflexible.
The other modes represent ways countries and traders have found to relax some
of the constraints it imposes, but without going completely to monetary trade.
A. Group 1: Exchange of Goods
i) Pure Barter
In pure barter, money enters into the transaction at most as a unit of
account. The parties may refer to the trade as involving goods worth X million
dollars, but negotiations are actually in terms of physical quantities. This
type of trade seems relatively rare. When it does occur, the size of the
transaction is frequently very large and tends to be negotiated on a government-
to- government basis.
The 1973/74 oil crisis gave rise to several such barters. In December 1974,
France agreed to swap a long list of industrial products, hydroelectric power
stations, and arms to Iran in return for a guaranteed supply of oil. Similarly,
Britain agreed to buy five million tons of oil from Iran in exchange for i 110
million of steel, cement, rubber, and paper. Iran negotiated the sale of these
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products directly with the individual companies. Had the companies failed to
reach an agreement, the British government would have had to intervene as best
it could. These kinds of deals are as much exercises in diplomacy as anything
else with the oil purchasing countries trying to assure themselves of oil sup-
plies. (See Section HID)
One recent case of pure barter involved the exchange between Bangladesh
and Pakistan of jute for cotton. The negotiators agreed on the quantity to be
traded and that the transfer would occur simultaneously. The two countries
engaged in a barter partially to conserve scarce hard currency, and partially
because they still are not on friendly terms with each other and were unwilling
4
therefore to extend credit.
ii) Partial Barter
Partial barter is common in East-West trade. In this mode the EB buyer
pays in both goods and hard currency. Negotiation establishes the proportion
with 20% to 507o in goods being typical. Recently, in an attempt to reduce
their trade deficits, the EBCs have increased their pressure on Western firms
to accept partial barter and to take a greater proportion of goods.
The East European FTO which negotiates the deal offers the goods that it
handles as payment. If these are not saleable in world markets, the firm may
get permission to take products handled by other FTOs. Although the agreement
will authorize the Western firm to buy a variety of products, when these are
the responsibility of FTOs other than the one that negotiated the barter, it
may be very difficult to get the formers' cooperation. This is a frequent prob-
lem. Each FTO has its own import requirements and hard currency earnings quotas.
No Foreign Trade Organization will willingly offer goods which it has no trouble
selling abroad. The Western firm may continuously have to urge the East Bloc
buyer to encourage its sister trading organizations actually to permit the
agreed-upon exports. Firms not meeting their export obligations will generally
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have to pay a penalty of 10-207= of the value of their barter commitment.
The EB buyers with whom the Western firms deal are professional negotia-
tors and very astute. One common bargaining ploy often encountered is the
"double trap-door trick." The EB negotiator initially suggests a cash pay-
ment and demands the Western firm's best price. He then lets the foreign
sales manager stew for weeks in his hotel room. Just as the contract is about
to be signed, the negotiator announces that his government requires partial
barter. If the manager's profit margin is large enough, he may agree to barter
provisions. At that point the negotiator sj>rings the second trap-door. An-
nouncing that he has managed to get permission to pay in cash, he demands a
further discount since the manager now does not have to take goods.
In another ploy, the FTO offers a highly saleable product. Again, just
before signing the agreement, the negotiator informs the Western firm that it
may sell the product only in certain markets since in the other (usually most
attractive) markets the FTO has already granted an exclusive agency. If the
Western firm wishes to sell the goods in these markets it will have to pay
sizeable commissions to the FTO's agents. If it accepts a partial barter,
the experienced Western firm ensures that the barter goods are exactly des-
cribed in an annex to the main export contract. The description includes quan-
tity, unit value, and quality provisions. The agreements also specify the per-
iod over which the EEC is to deliver the barter goods and the Western firm to
g
accept them, with one year appearing to be the usual term.
Clearly, the Western firm must do its homework before entering into nego-
tiations. It must, in effect, calculate an expected cost of barter provisions,
so that it can mark up its minimum price to a level where the firm can accept
the transaction while maintaining its profit margins. One possible tactic is
to develop a "worst case" hard currency price on the basis of having to take
the usual barter proportion, the cost of discounting the barter goods, and the
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payment of a non-performance penalty. If the East Bloc buyer balks at the
price, the Western firm can then counter-propose barter, reducing the price
as the contract provisions become more concrete. To do this the firm must
have a good idea of the products which are actually exportable, and the dis-
counts that these require. Basically, the firm should prepare a schedule of
minimum prices so that its final minimum will match the barter it accepts.
Sometimes a company will not mark-up its prices to cover barter costs.
It may instead use the barter to discriminate in its pricing. By absorbing
the costs, the company gives the buyer a discount. The effective discount is
hidden though from competitors and other customers.
iii) Local-Currency Barter
This mode differs from the preceeding one only in its mechanism. The
Western firm sells its goods and accepts payment in the local currency. Under
the terms of the agreement it can use these funds to buy from a list of local
products. As in the case of partial barter, the list is the subject of nego-
tiation. As an example of this mode, let us examine in some detail an actual
agreement in a developing country.
A few years ago, a Swiss pharmaceutical company entered into a barter agree-
ment with Bangladesh. The barter ran for three years and was renewed recently.
The Swiss firm invoiced its pharmaceutical shipments in Swiss francs but ac-
cepted payment in Bangladesh taka in a local account. A Swiss barter house
helped negotiate the deal and administered it for a fee. There were four cate-
gories of barter goods: (1) jute; (2) tea; (3) hides and skins, and shrimp;
and (4) miscellaneous goods comprising everything from beeswax and handicrafts
to electric cables. The Swiss firm could only apply about one quarter of its
local sales revenue to each category. The* first three categories posed no
marketing problems. The barter house merely contacted other European and Ameri-
can firms already buying the goods in question from Bangladesh and persuaded
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them to route their purchases through the barter account in return for a dis-
count. The European firm would inform its Bangladesh supplier that he would
receive payment in local currency. It would then pay hard currency to the
barter house which in turn would instruct its Bangladesh bank to pay taka to
the seller. The European buyer would end up paying, say, 95c for 10 taka worth
of jute instead of the $1 it would have had to pay without the barter. The
Bangladesh supplier did not care since he would have had to surrender his hard
currency earnings to the Central Bank anyway and thus was no worse off.
Since the European buyers knew the discounts they would receive beforehand,
the barter often rebounded to the sellers' advantage. It reduced the "export
tax" effect of the overvalued exchange rate (See Section lllA) and thus led
to some increase in prices received and volume sold.
The discount necessary to draw Western buyers into routing their purchases
through the Bangladesh barter ranged from a low of TL for tea to a high of
8-107o for hides and skins. For miscellaneous products, though, the discount
ranged from a low of 10-15% on some agricultural commodities to 25-30% for
handicrafts. Low quality, even in fairly unprocessed commodities such as honey
and molasses, was a recurring problem. It was especially severe in the case of
semi-manufactures such as newsprint. Frequently, even when quality was accept-
able as in the case of shoe-uppers, local production costs were too high.
Bangladesh, like many other LDCs, was particularly interested in promoting
the sale of handicrafts since this would directly help rural incomes. However,
the developed countries demand for handicrafts is limited, and the marketing
effort required is disproportionately high since there are few bulk buyers.
Finally, the barter house sometimes found buying opportunities in goods not
on the miscellaneous list. Before it could get government permission to buy
the product in question the opportunity would usually have passed. Overall,
the Swiss manufacturer estimated that in order to maintain its margins, it
would have to mark-up its prices about 357o to cover the barter costs.
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in its agreement with the Bangladesh government, the Swiss firm received
the right to operate its taka account in overdraft. When the barter house had
sold a sufficient quantity of Bangladeshi products to bring the account down to
its overdraft limit, the Swiss firm would ship enough pharmaceuticals to bring
the account back up to a zero balance. This ensured that if Bangladesh de-
valued, as it did, the company would get a foreign exchange gain rather than a
loss. The barter house's success in selling Bangladeshi products therefore con-
strained the pace of pharmaceutical shipments. This pace became quite slow
towards the end of the agreement period when only the miscellaneous quota re-
mained unfilled and led to some friction between the government and the manu-
facturer.
iv) Compensation Trade
Compenstion trade or counter- purchase involves at least two parallel con-
tracts. On the one hand, the Western firm is paid in hard currency for its
products. On the other, it signs a separate contract to buy an equal value of
goods from the importing company. The reason for the two contracts is that
most Western countries will only provide government export credits and guar-
antees for exports that are paid for in cash. There is frequently a third con-
tract also, the financing package. The Western firm's commercial bank and the
appropriate Foreign Trade Bank or other EB bank authorized to deal in foreign
9
exchange arrange this among themselves.
PepsiCo' s arrangement with the USSR is a good example of compensation
trade. Pepsi ships syrup to Novorossiyak where the Russians bottle it under
the company's supervision. The Soviets then distribute and sell the soft
drink throughout the country. PepsiCo agreed to take Stolichnaya vodka in
payment for its syrup and the use of its trademark. What converts this trans-
action from a pure barter to a compensation agreement is that the amount of
syrup which the USSR buys depends on the amount of vodka Pepsi can sell in
the US.-'-^
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B. Group 2:
Clearing Agreements, Switch, and Aller/Retour
i) Clearing Agreements
A clearing agreements represents monetary trade using a "book" money. The
two countries establishing the arrangement agree to exchange products over some
specified period and up to some maximum value. Each country agrees to accept as
payment for its exports to the other a credit in a special account maintained
in its name in the other's Central Bank. Debits to this clearing account then
pay for imports from the other country. The accounts may be denominated in the
partners' own currencies or use some other currency as numeraire. In the latter
case the account balances are known as "clearing dollars," "clearing Deutsche
Mark," etc. Whatever currencies are used, the agreement specifies the ex-
change rates that will apply. It also established a "swing" -- a limit on
the degree to which the accounts, and therefore trade, may be out of balance.
Clearing accounts rarely pay interest on credit balances or charge it on debit
ones. If trade between the two countries is not in balance on the settlement
date, the deficit either carries over to a new agreement or is wiped clean by
the acceptance of unwanted goods or the payment of hard currency. Finally, the
agreement often specifies the goods to be traded and their value.
An example may make all this clearer. Let us suppose that on January 1,
1976, Russia and India sign a $100 clearing agreeing. The swing is 307o of the
agreement value, the period is one year, and any closing deficit must be settled
in dollars. The countries establish accounts (symbolized by the T accounts be-
low) in their central banks. On March 31, the USSR sells $25 worth of goods to
India. The Indians credit the Russian's account with them, and the Russians
debit the Indian's account in Moscow. On June 31, the Indians sell $50 worth
of cotton to the USSR. The Russians credit the Indians' account with them, and
the Indians debit the Russians' account in New Delhi. On September 31, the
Russians sell $55 worth of machine tools to India. The USSR can not sell any
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more to India since they have reached the swing, that is, they have sold $30
worth of goods more than they have bought. There are no further transactions
and at midnight on December 31, the accounts are closed. The Russians have a
$30 credit balance with the Indians, and the latter have an equal debit balance
with the former. The Indians credit the Russian account $30 and pay them that
amount in hard currency. The Russians apply the cash against the Indian
deficit.
USSR India
50
^
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with barter goods that they do not really want. This occurs when a country
settles its deficit in goods. In the example above, suppose India had paid
in brass incense burners rather than dollars.
A third disadvantage is that since the agreements do not provide for
interest payments or charges, the trading partners have little incentive
to reduce deficits quickly.
Finally, certain countries have had bad experiences in trading with
the Communist Bloc. Egypt and Pakistan, in particular, did not benefit from
rises in commodity prices in the early 1970 's because they had regularly
bartered saleable commodities to Eastern Europe two or three years in ad-
12
vance of actual deliveries.
Clearing agreement imbalances and the problems of unwanted goods have
led to the development of "switch," and aller/retour . Aller and retour
("to go" and "return," in French) are essentially types of switch trade.
The switch trader disposes of goods on the world market that a country has
agreed to accept under a clearing agreement, but for which it has no use.
He may direct an unwanted cargo of, for instance, shoes from Pakistan en
route to Bulgaria, to Hamburg or Rotterdam where the trader "switches"
their desintation. He seels the shoes for hard currency to an importer
in Europe or in the U.S. and pays the Bulgarians, charging them a commission
for his services. In 1970, Bulgaria switched 73% of its trade with West
13Pakistan to third markets.
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This type of switch is frequently referred to as retour . Figure 1 below
illustrates such a transaction.
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As an example of aller (Figure 2), suppose Russia has agreed to trade
India pharmaceuticals for tea. It accepts the tea but doesn't have the chem-
icals available. It contacts a switch trader in Lausanne who, in turn, finds
a German pharmaceutical company with excess inventory. The German ships the
goods in neutral packing from Hamburg. The Russians pay the trader in hard
currency at an agreed upon discount from the invoice amount. The trader then
pays the Germans, after first subtracting his fee. The cargo documents
pass through Moscow on their way to India. Here they are switched to indicate
Russian origin and shipment via Hamburg.
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In the past, some Western countries have used aller to get the profits of
their subsidiaries out of countries when exchange controls have restricted re-
patriation. This requires the cooperation, arranged by a switch trader, of an
East Bloc country with a clearing debit balance in its trade with the IDC in
question. The subsidiary applies for and receives permission from its country's
central bank to import raw materials or components via the agreement. The com-
pany ships the goods to its subsidiary and over- invoices for them. As in ordin-
ary aller transactions, the goods purport to be of East European origin, and
payments and documents flow through the clearing channels. Goods worth $100,000
in free currency are invoiced at $220,000. The EBC pays the shipper $200,000 in
hard currency and receives a credit of the full invoice amount against its debit
balance with the LDC. The shipper pays the switch trader for his services. The
subsidiary receives the goods and pays its country's Central Bank the counter-
value of $220,000 in local currency at the official exchange rate. The company
has succeeded in extracting its profits via a seemingly arms-length transaction.
The EBC has earned a fee and reduced its deficit. Only the LDC has lost in that
the company has evaded the government's restrictions. Such transactions are
rare, but they do occur despite LDC government's attempts to prevent them.
Aller and retour are fairly simple transactions. Clearing agreements can give
rise to more complex ones.
East European countries often sell more under a clearing agreement than
they buy and may offer their clearing credits to Western firms instead of hard
currency as payment for purchases. The firm can then either use the clearing
credits to buy goods it needs or can sell internationally, or it can sell them
to a switch bourse at a discount. The size of the discount will depend on in
which country the credit is useable, and against v/hat goods. The following
example may clarify this procedure.
An American wants to sell to Yugoslavia. He approaches a switch trader
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who informs him that the Yugoslavs are currently offering payment in Greek
clearing dollars on which the prevailing discount is 107o. The American marks
his price up from $100,000 to $110,000. If the deal goes through, he accepts
payment in Greek clearing which he sells to the trader for $100,000. The
trader then finds a German importer who wants to buy walnuts from Greece.
The German pays the trader $103,000 and gets the $110,000. The German buys
the walnuts and the Greek exporter gets the local currency equivalent of the
$110,000. The walnuts are ostensibly shipped to a Yugoslav port, but while
en route the documents are amended and the destination is changed to Hamburg.
For his services the trader gets the $3,000 difference between what the German
13paid him and what he had to pay the American.
K)- S FidM
flC^i/RE 3:
Ci.(ic-.
-^iiO
Yj!.-e'.>i.Hl/i
Fftee ^ 'ff Tp.fi'biR.
C>-^t.MflKj FiH^
fr-PC»>i
ClUi.. p/0
->
<-
C-aeecis
This is still something of a simplication. Often the transactions involve
several clearing and barter arrangements before the final shipment of merchandise
is paid for in free exchange.
Switch trade serves a useful function. By providing a secondary market
for bartered goods, it increases the barter's utility since countries can accept
goods for which they do not themselves have a use. It can result in new customers
and markets for LDC products when the switch traders have better market inform-
ation than do the LDCs. By reversing the effects of an overvalued currency it
brings prices more in line with world prices.
The exporting country may, however, still object to switching. The switch,
rather than opening up a new market, may do no more than dump products in tra-
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ditional markets. If Egypt is selling cotton to Europe, it does not want
switched cotton sold there at a substantial discount. Not only does this
annoy those customers who had paid the full price, but it also puts a down-
ward pressure on the prices Egypt can charge in the future.
Countries often include a clause in barter or clearing agreements that
prohibits re-export to third countries. But government officials generally
know that strict adherence to such a clause would reduce their trade. There-
fore, while including the clause, they agree to the naming of a convenient
14
third country port as the shipping destination.
C, Group 3: Barter for Intangibles
i) Product Buy-Back
Under this system, the exporter in the West barters, to the EBC, the
technology to build a factory in return for some of the output once it is
in operation. The terms of such agreements may require that the firm buy
back 20-30% of the plant's annual production for a period of 10-15 years.
These arrangements suit the EBC's since they provide credit, guarantee some
demand for the factory's output, and generate foreign exchange. Buy-back
frequently poses problems, though, for the Western firm, particularly in the
areas of quality, delivery, competition, and price.
Eastern European manufacturing output frequently does not match Western
standards. Therefore, most agreements contain a clause giving the Western
partner nearly absolute control over quality. Bendix agreed to build a spark
plug plant in the USSR, and to market 25% of the output in the West. The plugs
were to be marked "Made in the USSR" and sold under the Bendix label. The com-
pany, however, insisted on having its own inspectors in the plant with the right
to reject substandard output. The negotiations stalled over this point for some
time but now the Russians have agreed to the requirement and plans are going
forward
.
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It is risky to rely exclusively on deliveries from Eastern Europe in
the initial stages of a cooperative venture. Initial production difficulties,
both in producing the goods and in meeting quality standards, may cause failure
to meet delivery dates. Delivery may also suffer from delays in receiving
local raw materials or sub-components due to endemic shortages and back-logs
of orders. Finally, the East European buyers often under-buy in terms of
plant capacity and end up absorbing the entire output internally. The agree-
ments usually provide for penalties (cash or goods) if the East Bloc firm cannot
deliver on time or meet quality requirements. This can cut both ways since the
agreements usually also provide for penalties in the event the Western firm
does not carry out its purchase requirements.
In selling its technology, the Western partner may be creating a new com-
petitor. Firms usually do not sell their most recent technology or models and
impose restrictions on export markets. The Eastern European buyers naturally
resist these practices and the final contract will depend on the relative bar-
gaining strengths and skills of the negotiators.
In some cases, the buyers will over-buy, that is, purchase capacity in
excess of their current domestic requirements, with a view to exporting surplus
production. As Fiat has discovered, even superseded models can provide compet-
ition. It is feeling the effects of sales in Europe and elsewhere of the Russian
version of the Fiat 124.
The pricing clause of the contract often causes the greatest difficulty
in negotiations. The Western partner usually delivers the equipment and machinery
it is selling shortly after signing the contract. It can fix its prices and hold
to them without great difficulty. East European production on the other hand
will not commence for some time, perhaps two or three years, and may continue
for more than a decade thereafter.
Expecting fixed prices for the East European firm's output over the whole
period is clearly unrealistic. Instead, more recent contracts often have a
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clause providing a mechanism for adjusting prices to changed conditions. Since
the Western firm has no control over the East Bloc firm's cost calculations, a
common solution is to tie the price to the Western firm's ex-factory price, or
to the wholesale price in the firm's major markets, with prices and exact quan-
tities being reviewed semi-annually or annually. Finally, agreements often
provide for price adjustments due to mutually agreed upon quality changes.
ii) Coproduction or Cooperation Agreements
In a co-production agreement, both partners customarily make reciprocal
deliveries of components which they use in a jointly finished product. Generally,
the East Bloc partner produces the majority of the parts, while the Western firm
provides the more sophisticated components. The reciprocal deliveries represent
a barter payment mechanism. This is completely separate from the mutual market-
ing and/or profit-sharing arrangements, if any, which the partners may make.
Western firms enter into cooperation agreements for a variety of reasons.
In particular, they hope to get access to a new market and to take advantage of
lower wages in the East Bloc. The Eastern European firms gain new technology
and a wider market for their products. Even so, individual EB factories may
enter into cooperation deals with reluctance despite governmental policy favor-
ing such arrangements. Launching a new product in an existing plant can cause
a temporary reduction in output and endanger the factory's overall plan fulfill-
ment. Below plan performance means lower bonuses for management and workers
and it is, therefore, not surprising if Eastern European managers show some
lack of enthusiasm for the proposed venture. Producing the new product in a
newly-built plant avoids this problem, but generally results in a longer "shake-
down" period for output to reach planned quality and quantity targets. Co-
production is prone to many of the same problems as buy-back. Business Inter -
national estimates that while Western and East European firms have established
more than 1000 such ventures, many are now dormant because of the quality and
price problems.
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iii) Barter as Payment for Services
Co-production and product buy-back include a component of barter for services.
Goods pay for technical assistance. Many ordinary barters have a similar aspect
in that the goods the Western firm or barter specialist accepts represent pay-
ment for marketing services as well as the original merchandise. Many EEC's
and LDC's do not yet have the expertise and contacts to market their goods
internationally. Developing a marketing network is expensive and takes time.
In addition, the centralized EB economies do not provide an environment conducive
to developing the necessary expertise domestically. While the countries could
buy marketing services for cash, they prefer to conserve their hard currency.
III. Why Barter?
This section explores the reasons countries turn to barter in their inter-
national trade. The discussion posits four, the first pair representing suffi-
cient causes and the second, benefits derivable from barter which are of them-
selves neither sufficient nor necessary since they are achievable via other
arrangements.
The two sufficient reasons are: a) to adjust the relative prices at which
goods trade when their nominal prices do not reflect their real scarcity value
and b) to enable trade to take place despite the absence of some form of money
acceptable to both trading parties. The two supplementary reasons are: c) to
improve the countries' terms of trade and d) to establish long-term contracts
and trading relationships.
A. Price Distortions
When prices are out of line with the real scarcity value of goods, individuals
will turn to barter. For instance, after World War II prices in Germany were
still frozen at 1936 levels even though wartime financing had increased liquid
funds in the public's hands tenfold. Prices were so out of line that legal
sale could frequently only take place at a financial loss. A small "black
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market" (i.e., outright trading of goods for cash at illegal prices) developed,
as did a great deal of "compensation trade." Sale took place at legal prices
19
in money, augmented by compensation in real goods and services.
Part of the explanation for the emergence of barter trade during periods
of inflation, recession or uncertainty is that during these periods prices
may be "sticky" for legal or institutional reasons. In particular, during
periods when the actual inflation rate deviates substantially from the expected
rate, sellers will be reluctant to trade for money since they will be unsure of
the accuracy of their pricing, or of the utility of money as a store of value.
The 1973 OPEC cartel oil price increase gives an example of similar dis-
tortions operating internationally. The new oil price was clearly excessive
in relation to that which would have resulted under pure competition. The
Western countries engaged in barters for oil not only to assure themselves
of supplies, but also to reduce the real price. The oil selling countries
probably received a reduction in monopoly rents on the goods they bought, and
avoided receiving payment in money the value of which they were uncertain. By
taking payment in goods they were able to avoid some of the effects of the
price-rise induced shocks to the Western economies and the concomitant inflation.
In the case of the EBCs and the LDCs, prices are frequently out of line
with real scarcity values under ordinary circumstances. In the EBCs the govern-
ment sets the prices, not the market, and on a basis other than marginal pro-
ductivity or cost. This may occur in LDCs as well. However, the major price
distortion common to both sets of countries involves fixed exchange rates. The
countries' currencies are almost invariably overvalued. That is, the government
will exchange local currency for, say, dollars at a rate of 10 local currency
units to $1 when local residents would willingly exchange currencies at a rate
of 15 to 1. The overvalued exchange rate acts as a de-facto tax on exports
(raising their prices) and a subsidy to imports (lowering theirs). Barter
then provides a way to undo these effects at least on the goods bartered.
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The two parties to the transaction can bypass the exchange rate, ignore
nominal prices, and trade in terms of real prices. At the very least, the
implicit prices of the goods will be their world prices since each trader's
opportunity cost is what he could sell his goods for on the open market, and
his buying price ceiling the international price of the other party's goods.
Finally, prices may be out of line with real scarcity values when they
are set by a cartel. Barter then provides cartel members with a way seemingly
to trade at official prices, while actually selling at a discount. In this
way a country can increase sales volume and still get a good price without
starting a price war that would result in the cartel's collapse.
For example, in 1975 sharply falling demand for its oil threatened Al-
geria's economic development plans and it utilized barter as a way to secretly
undercut the OPEC prices. Algeria arranged a number of exchanges of oil for
trucks and machinery. Massey- Ferguson, Mitsubishi, and others received the
oil, at the OPEC price of $11.75/barrel, in payment for their goods. Not being
in the oil business, the companies engaged the services of traders who sold the
oil on world markets. In order to encourage purchases of their oil, the com-
panies offered substantial discounts off the OPEC price. They did not lose,
however, since they had marked up the prices of their goods to cover the barter
costs including the traders' fees and the discounts. When it became clear that
the bartered oil was being offered in the world markets at $10.75/barrel, the
Algerian government denied that it had intended to undercut the official price
and broke off negotiations for further barters that were underway with Renault.
The Algerians reportedly expected discounts of a few percentage points, but
20
what actually happned both surprised and embarrassed them.
More recently, Iran has arranged a number of counter-purchase transactions
with Western firms for the same reasons as the Algerians did. However, they
are being more careful in ensuring that the discounts are small enough so as
21
not to incur- the displeasure of the other OPEC members.
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B. Liquidity and Credit
The barter arrangements that have grown up since World War II, particularly
the clearing agreements, serve another function, that of providing liquidity.
Even when countries want to engage in monetary trade they may be unable to do
so because of a shortage of international reserves. The reserves are assets
which national governments are ready to accept from other national governments
in settlement of debts. Because of this acceptability in transactions between
countries, governments accumulate these assets and use them as "reserves" against
periods when aggregate payments to foreigners exceed aggregate receipts from
22
them. The assets typically used are convertible currencies, gold, and Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), Not only do countries
have insufficient amounts of these assets for their trade requirements, they also
often have exchange control systems which limit the usefulness of their own cur-
rencies.
Exchange control regulations usually require buyers and sellers of foreign
exchange to deal only with the government or authorized banks, and only at the
official rate. Exporters must invoice their buyers in hard currency and must
surrender their earnings in return for domestic currency. Importers can only
buy the foreign exchange necessary to pay for government authorized purchases.
The purpose of these regulations is to reduce the size of the domestic black
market and the external free market in order to prevent firms and individuals
from using these to bypass the government controls. The currencies subject to
such controls are termed inconvertible. One can distinguish two types of in-
23
convertibility, currency and commodity. In the first case, recipients of
such currencies cannot freely transfer them into other currencies. This makes
them relatively unacceptable as international reserves and other countries will
be unwilling to accumulate them. In the second case, the issuing countries are
unwilling to let outsiders buy what they will in the domestic economy. Section
IV will discuss these points more fully. At this point it is sufficient to note
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that countries with inconvertible currencies and insufficient international
reserves must devise other ways to pay for import surpluses since in essence
they either cannot or will not use their own currencies.
As we discussed in Section II, barter and clearing agreements are logical
solutions to the problem of insufficient liquidity. In the case of barter,
goods pay for goods directly. Clearing agreements create bank deposits that
are money within the framework of the agreement.
Clearing agreements also facilitate the granting of credit. Countries
can extend credit to each other because the terms of the agreement reduce risk.
The agreement in effect gives the creditor a lien on goods produced by the debtor.
This is similar to a mortgage though of course there is no over-arching body to
enforce the contract. The fact that the maximum amount and duration of the credit
are set is a more important limit on the risk.
C. Terms of Trade
Countries, like individuals, tend to want to receive a higher price for
what they sell, and pay a lower one for what they buy. Barter can assist them
in achieving both these aims.
i) Selling
As mentioned in III A above, an overvalued exchange rate acts as a tax on
exports, and a subsidy to imports. When a country has an overvalued exchange
rate, clearly it is in its interest to insist on the use of cash for purchases
of those of its exports for which the own-price elasticity of demand is less than
the own- price elasticity of supply. In such cases, the "tax" burden falls more
heavily on the buyer than the supplier. The country can then use the revenue
from the de facto tax on exports to reduce the price to itself of the goods it
must buy abroad. Countries with relatively weak administrative structures may
favor over-valued exchange rates even when the bulk of the burden falls on dom-
estic producers. The "export tax" is possibly one of the few taxes the govern-
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ment can collect.
The foreign exchange generated at the official exchange rate is often in-
sufficient to pay for all the imports a country desires. The overvaluation
causes many of the country's potential exports to be too expensive. The problem
then is to remove the effect of the exchange rate on those products where it is,
on balance, counterproductive. Three possible solutions are: dual or even
multiple exchange rates; special export prices; and barter.
Dual exchange systems use one official rate for some transactions, and
another official or free rate for others. Some countries even have multiple
rates. The applicable rate then depends on the type of transaction, the goods,
or the foreign currencies involved. The fixed exchange rates and the attendant
system of controls on transactions separate the domestic economy from the world
economy. When the government's purpose is to insulate the domestic economy
from external disturbances, the rate on real goods transactions is generally
24
the official one, and the rate on financial transactions the free one. When
the purpose is to stop capital outflows these relationships are reversed.
Dual exchange rates are hard to police. There may be "leakages" with capi-
25
tal flows disguising themselves as real goods transactions. Buy using an
official rate augmented by barter, a government establishes a _de facto dual ex-
change system. All money transfers, and some trade, take place at the official
rate. Barter then approximates a free rate for real transactions, and particul-
arly for those hampered by the official rate.
To use a system of special export prices the selling country simply sets
what it feels are optimal prices given the world market situation and makes
them available to all foreign buyers. This is a form of price discrimination
in that foreign buyers face different prices than do domestic ones. An export
price system requires no better market intelligence than does barter, and no
expenditure of effort on negotiations. Generally one would expect that selling
countries would favor special export prices when they face many small buyers.
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Barter permits a finer discrimination since the seller can negotiate a differ-
ent implicit price with each buyer. When there are many small buyers negotia-
tion costs outweigh the benefits of this finer discrimination and export prices
are preferable.
It is not surprising therefore to find countries that use barter in their
trade prefering to deal on a country- to- country basis, or with large foreign
firms. This tendency is reinforced in the case of the EBCs by their unwilling-
ness to let foreigners buy at will even at export prices because of the dis-
ruption this might cause to economic plans.
ii) Buying
First, many of the goods LDCs and EBCs wish to import from the West are
differentiated products produced by only a few companies and whose prices in-
clude some element of oligopoly rent. Second, overvalued exchange rates sub-
sidize imports. This means that their social cost is greater than the nominal
cost facing buyers, be they private companies or state enterprises. Third,
state-owned firms that are not expected to make profits or that have monopoly
power in the domestic economy will have very inelastic demand schedules for
imports. They can pass costs on to consumers either directly in product prices
or indirectly through the taxes the government levies to make up the losses the
firms suffer.
One can expect the governments of the EBCs and LDCs therefore to favor con-
ducting import purchasing via state trading organizations. In this way the
government can increase the degree to which purchase decisions reflect social
rather than private or nominal cost. More importantly, the organizations can
present suppliers with a more elastic demand schedule than the later would face
if they were permitted to approach potential customers directly. Since the
seller has little access to independent information, he has no way of knowing
if the buyers' demand schedule is as elastic as the state trading organization
represents it to be.
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So far this is simply an argument for centralizing bargaining, with no
mention of barter. What barter may permit the buyer to do is to take greater
advantage of his ability to deceive the seller. As we noticed before in the
case of cartel prices (Section IIIA), barter permits the parties to publish the
nominal prices at which they are trading, while concealing the real prices. When
the seller takes payment in a number of goods which are then sold in different
countries for various currencies, it is very difficult for any outsider to the
transaction to reconstruct the real price. The seller via barter can therefore
afford to give the buyer a discount because he knows it will go no further, that
is, other potential customers will not find out about it and bargain for similar
preferential prices.
In both buying and selling then, barter, while not creating monopoly or
bargaining power for the country, nevertheless may enable it to draw a greater
benefit from the power it does possess.
D. Long-term Contracts and Trading Relationships
Some barter agreements represent what are in essence exchanges of long-
term futures or options contracts. This is certainly one aspect of most clear-
ing agreements. The inter- country oil barters after 1973 referred to earlier
are another example. The recent Japanese-Chinese trade agreement may be a third.
In effect what the parties to the barters are doing is exchanging long-
term purchase contracts, and options (the right, without obligation, to buy or
sell specified goods at specified prices over the period of the agreement).
The futures contracts' ability to reduce uncertainty is especially important
to centrally planned economies because of their plans' sensitivity to unexpec-
ted developments.
It is probably easier to arrange this exchange of contracts between coun-
tries than between a country and a firm. Ex ante both parties to an agreement
expect to benefit. Ex post . one or the other will get the better of the deal
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depending on the direction in which prices move. If the contract results in
an actual loss to one side or the other, for any given size of the loss, com-
panies are more likely to go bankrupt than are countries. Rightly or wrongly,
27
this does seem to be a concern for many firms. Moreover, countries are per-
haps better able than companies to diversify the risks of such contracts. While
a company may buy only one good from a country, two countries may be able to
exchange a number of goods. If the prices of these goods are not perfectly
correlated, each country can expect that ex post what it loses on some con-
tracts it will make up on others.
Finally a long-term barter creates a relationship between the trading
partners. Some countries may count among the benefits of barter any dependence
they create on their partner's side. However, this is probably of waning im-
portance since the increasing number of alternatives in terms of trading part-
ners and arrangements must work to reduce the price any one nation can demand
for accomodating the preferences of another. The more amorphous benefits of
a relationship remain though.
In a world of rapid changes and great uncertainty, one cannot write contracts
to cover all eventualities. The essence of a commercial relationship however is
a mutual implicit contract that whatever transpires, the parties will extend
'most favored' status to each other. There is a mutual understanding that no
third party will receive more favorable terms in contracts than those extended
to the party with whom one has the relationship. Frequently one has the impression
that the implicit contract is even more specific. The mutual understanding is
that should there be discontinuous changes in the availability of some good, i.e.,
some sudden gluts or famines, the party in the strong position will continue to
buy from or sell to its partner, respectively, as nearly 'normal' quantities at
'fair' prices as possible. Put another way, during supply or demand crises par-
ties to a relationship are expected to clear the market between them, on a quan-
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tity rather than a price basis.
As in the discussion on terms of trade, one can achieve the same ends in
ways that do not involve barter. However, once again, given that a country is
engaging in barter trade, the establishment of long-term contracts and the
creation of trading relationships represent additional benefits.
IV. Barter's Future in International Trade
This section will explore a little more fully the origins of the proximate
causes discussed above. In particular it will concern itself with the political-
economic causes of the price distortions and the lack of liquidity. These are
important because they indicate a different future for barter in the trade re-
lations of the developed Western countries, the East Bloc (including the People's
Republic of China (PRC) and the other Asian Communist countries), and the LDCs.
This paper has taken as a basic premise that, in general, monetary trade
is more efficient than barter. It is more flexible and transactions costs are
lower. This it permits a greater volume of trade. This view in turn leads to
the expectation that barter, when it occurs, will be a transitory phenomenon.
It may re-occur since the events that cause monetary trade to break down (infla-
tions, wars, depressions, etc.) are themselves recurrent. Nevertheless one
would expect barter to represent a temporary regression pending the re-establish-
ment of monetary trade.
Much current international barter though has persisted for some time and
had, in fact, become quite institutionalized. This is particularly true of
the EBCs' trade with the West and the LDCs, and to a lesser degree the LDCs'
trade among themselves and with the West. The view of barter as a temporary
phenomenon really applies primarily to the Western countries -- those with mar-
ket economies and private ownership of productive enterprises.
In these countries trade occurs between firms (and individuals) that
usually have a wide legal latitude to set their prices where they will, and to
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trade with whomsoever they choose. As a result one can expect that prices will
adjust rapidly to reflect real scarcity values. The openness of the countries'
economies means that foreigners will accept their currencies in exchange for
goods. In fact, firms can transact their business with each other in any
money they choose to, even if it is neither trading partner's domestic cur-
rency. The international monetary and financial system is well developed.
Therefore there is little of the systematic price distortion or lack of liquidity
that gives rise to barter.
A. Barter Trade and the East Bloc Countries
While barter's future as a form of trade between Western Countries is a
limited and transitory one, this is not so for the EBCs -- those with centrally
planned economies and state ownership of productive enterprises. One can see
the reasons most clearly in the case of the Soviet Union, the EBC with probably
the most comprehensive central planning and the least need for trade.
If one examines the Soviet Union's foreign trade system one can see why
barter persists. The Soviet Union does not trade to maximize the monetary or
commercial gains from trade or the volume of trade. The Ministry of Foreign
Trade acts as a procurement office for the State. It purchases those imports
of capital goods the planners feel are necessary to fulfill the plans, and those
inputs, such as agricultural commodities, that are in temporary shortage. Tra-
ditional exports and goods in temporary surplus are exported in amounts necessary
28
to pay for imports. The goal of the State is the "maximization of national
production capacity and of national output," while strictly limiting external
29influences on the domestic economy. Hence imports are heavily biased towards
capital goods and away from consumer goods. Foreign trade is a state monopoly
with the FTOs acting as a barrier between Western sellers or buyers and Soviet
productive enterprises. Most importantly, the USSR has decided to keep the
ruble inconvertible. Soviet planners find it inconceivable that persons not
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under their control should be allowed to hold rubles, i.e., to possess general
claims on the domestic economy.
There are some minor exceptions to this inconvertability. Tourists may
buy some rubles when they enter the USSR but they must exchange any unspent
amounts when they leave. There is also a small free market in Finland. However,
the Soviet Union permits neither the export of its currency nor foreign owner-
ship of ruble bank balances. Even if a foreign firm somehow came legally to
hold rubles it could only apply these against those goods the plan decreed
were available for trade.
Domestic deviations from world prices are fairly unimportant in explaining
the occurrence of barter. Even if world prices were, by chance, to pertain,
the Soviet Union would still maintain an inconvertible currency and need to
use barter arrangements for additional liquidity and credit.
Barter has two operational aspects that make it attractive to planners.
First, it is administratively convenient. Each transaction balances exports
and imports. This simplifies the task of planning balanced trade. Second,
it extends the domestic planning system to the foreign trade sector. It enables
planners who are concerned ultimately with physical quantities to conduct their
trade on this basis rather than in value terms. However, these two advantages
are trivial alongside the central consideration of command over the economy.
The Soviet Union willingly gives up some of the efficiency of monetary trade
in order to achieve the political- economic goal of maximum control over the
economy.
There is no reason to expect that this will change in the foreseeable
future. The Soviet Union is not trying to maximize the gains from trade but
rather to minimize necessary trade. In this context, the costs of inefficiency
are relatively minor. They are probably minor in absolute terms as well.
The two diagrams below illustrate the effect of proportional transactions
costs and taxes on imports and exports assuming the worst possible cases from
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the Soviet Union's point of view -- that is when it is a price taker for its
exports and imports. In these cases it bears all the costs of the ineffici-
encies.
In Figures 4 and 5, D' and S' represent the after taxes and costs demand
and supply curves for its imports and exports respectively. The two triangles
ABC represent the deadweight loss of consumers' and supplier's surplus which
the Soviet Union bears entirely as buyer and seller. The deadweight loss is
analogous to losses to friction. Eliminating them would represent a gain from
nature -- a reduction in waste. The shaded areas represent transfers, i.e.,
one party's loss is the other's gain.
One can attribute a large portion of this area to the tax effects of an
over-valued exchange rate. The transfer here is between the Soviet Union as
buyer or producer and the Soviet Union as taxing authority, and hence is ir-
relevant. Another portion represents the transfer of surplus to middlemen
(barter firms and FTOs) for negotiation, administration, and marketing. Many
of these services are as necessary under monetary trade as under barter. The
cost of barter therefore reduces to the deadweight loss and the extra costs
of negotiation and administration attributable to the choice of barter over
monetary trade.
There is no reason to believe that the cost of barter is so burdensome
that the USSR will give up a large measure of its control over its economy in
order to avoid it. The deadweight loss is an unrealized potential, something
r
/which is a less pressing convern than actual expenditures. These though seem
quite minor, at least as extra costs. In addition, as the discussion in Section
/ IIIC & D pointed out, barter can have certain economic benefits, jthus the net
economic position may actually favor barter. Even if it does not, the Soviet
Union is willing and able to make other, greater sacrifices for political reasons.
Its foreign trade system is simply another case of this.
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The situation vis-a-vis the other EBCs is more complex. With the excep-
tion of the PRC, all are far smaller than the USSR and have a proportionately
greater need for trade, thus the costs of barter weigh more heavily on their
economies. Several seem to be reducing detailed planning. While maintaining
state ownership they are decentralizing some decision making to the productive
enterprises. This could, in the long-run, result in their opening their eco-
nomies more as the plans become indicative rather than prescriptive and thus
less readily disruptable. The probable direction for the change in structure
of their trade would then be away from barter and towards a system of import
and export licenses. The process is a very slow one, especially since it must
30
take place under the wary eye of the USSR.
The amount of barter trade between the EB on the one hand and the West
and the LDCs on the other will therefore not diminish in the near future.
Barter may even increase its relative share of East-West trade. If the EB's
need for imports grows faster than cash exports, it will have to increase the
amount it borrows from the West, and/or the amount of barter. For a variety
of reasons the EB's debt capacity is limited and may not grow at a rate suffi-
cient to fund the trade deficit. Thus, the Soviet Minister for Foreign Trade
has recently emphasized that his country must, for financial reasons, turn in-
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creasingly to barter for its purchases in the West.
B, Barter and the Less Developed Countries
While the economies of Singapore and Hong Kong are even more open than that
of the US, and Burma's even less so than the USSR's, the LDCs tend to fall some-
where between the West and the EB on this dimension. Many have inconvertible
currencies. Generally, though, the inconvertibility accompanies foreign ex-
change controls rather than vice-versa. These cases are more one of currency
than commodity inconvertibility. While the governments control the exchange
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of the local currency for foreign ones, foreign traders may purchase what-
ever domestic goods they please. Most of the LDCs have large private sectors
and essentially market economies. Their concern is more with protecting the
exchange rate than restricting access to the economy.
Historically, a prime reason for exchange controls has been the attempt
on the part of governments to prevent the import of financial assets, or as
it is more commonly known, capital flight. The government may wish to retain
capital within the country so that it will be available for investment. It
may have ideological objections to its citizens owning assets abroad. It may
see capital outflows as motivated by, in its view, incorrect expectations
(panics or excessive pessimism) of the value of money and wish to prevent
these from affecting the real economy by reducing domestic demand.
The excessive import of goods relative to exports can also cause govern-
ments to turn to exchange controls. Many LDCs' exports are commodities sub-
32ject to wide price fluctuations. However, the countries have a stable de-
mand for imports. If a country is unable to borrow internationally as much as
it would need to keep imports steady it may use exchange controls to counter-
act balance of payments disequilibria rather than letting its exchange rate
flucuate. The controls limit the drain on the country's foreign exchange re-
serves by rationing imports in accordance with a schedule of priorities. In
this way the country diverts foreign exchange earnings from low priority uses
such as imports of luxuries and non-essential consumer goods, and reserves
them for capital goods and debt service. The country can then use its limited
borrowing capacity to augment its foreign exchange reserves.
When a government faces a situation where imports, of whatever sort,
exceed exports, it can respond by devaluing its currency or by defending
the exchange rate. If it simply devalues this will raise the amount of dom-
estic production it will have to sell internationally to pay for its imports,
which may not even be the ones the government feels are socially desirable.
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e.g., too many Mercedes Benz A50SLs, and too little fertilizer. If it main-
tains the exchange rate by funding the excess imports out of reserves but
without imposing controls, it will find itself subsidizing the rich as well
as the poor. Generally the reserves will run out long before the import de-
mand does, and the country will still have to devalue. Maintaining the over-
valued exchange rate by a recourse to exchange controls taxes the producers
and buyers of exports and limits the subsidy to consumers of imports to those
groups favored by the government. This strategy reduces the quantities of
both imports and exports and creates an opportunity for barter.
Barter trade between the Western developed countries and the LDCs will
wax and wane with the world business cycle. When the world economy is boom-
ing, demand for LDC exports rises. This reduces their trade deficits. It may
even result in a trade surplus and reverse the direction of capital flows. The
reduction in the overvaluation of the currencies removes the opportunity for
barter. As already discussed, the reverse occurs when the world economy is in
recession and the demand for LDCs' exports drops. While some countries will
be out of step with the world economy, by and large the cyclicality in barter
opportunities will hold for quite some time.
Whether the country does or does not engage in barter will nevertheless
depend on a number of political considerations. If the only goods it can offer
are its traditional exports (which are currently being sold for hard currency)
entering into a barter will mean reducing the quantity of cash imports. One
can expect the consumers of these goods to resist the reduction in their sub-
sidy. Export producers may benefit and if so will favor the transaction. How-
ever, the very fact that they are taxed implies that they are politically
weaker than the group subsidized. .
Clearly, governments will most welcome barters that propose to export
goods currently not exported. These pose no political problem since they do
not reduce the country's foreign exchange earnings. Such goods are unfortun-
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ately not always available in sufficient quantity to warrant the organiza-
tion of a barter. Overall one can expect far less barter to occur than the
presence of overvalued exchange rates alone would indicate is possible.
In the long run, one can expect the role of barter in the LDCs' trade
to decline in importance for two reasons. First, the LDCs' development and
diversification of their economies will act to reduce their dependence on raw
material exports. Second, the further development of world capital markets
will give countries financial means of smoothing their foreign exchange earn-
ings.
In summation, barter as a mode of international trade would seem to have
three different futures. Among Western countries it will accompany major
crises and be quite transitory. In the trade of the LDCs it will appear
cyclically, but around a declining trend line. Only in the case of the
will it remain a permanent part of their trade relations and grow as their
trade grows.
V. Summary
This paper had two purposes. First, to acquaint students of international
business with the characteristics of barter trade. Second, to show that a
country's use of barter did not represent a mysterious or irrational choice
on its part but rather was analyzable and understandable within the framework
of Western political and economic theory.
To these ends. Section I reviewed barter's recent history and argued that
although it was the oldest form of trade, it was inefficient in comparison to
monetary trade. The key point is that monetary trade avoids the "double co-
incidence" (the parties having complementary goods and needs at the same time)
which is necessary for barter to take place.
Section II discussed the various modes of barter met with in international
trade today. It described typical provisions and problems Western firms might
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expect to meet when negotiating and administering such transactions. The
modes considered included: pure, partial, and local currency barter, and
compensation trade; clearning agreements and their derivatives, switch and
aller/retour ; and product buy-back, co-production, and barter for services.
The third Section began by focusing on the two proximate causes for
barter, price distortions and need for liquidity, and the two benefits,
improvement of the terms of trade and the creation of long-term contracts
and trading relationships. Overvalued exchange rates were credited with be-
ing the most common source of distortions, with barter then providing a means
of nullifying their effects. The paper argued that barter enabled some trade
to take place when at least one of the trading countries had insufficient
international reserves and could not or would not use its own currency to pay
for its purchases. Clearing agreements were described as carrying this a
step further by creating bank deposits that were a form of money within the
context of the arrangement, and by providing a framework for countries to
grant each other limited trade credit.
Next, barter was credited with providing countries with a way to charge
different prices to different buyers and thus to benefit from any monopoly
power they possess. Similarly, when foreigners had some monopoly power, the
countries could disguise their true demand schedules and take advantage of
their suppliers' desire to discriminate among buyers. The key aspect of
barter that makes all this possible is that barter terms by their very nature
obscure the actual prices paid. Finally, the paper argued that, via barter,
countries could exchange long-term contracts and establish trading relation-
ships and thus reduce risk in their foreign trade.
Section IV explored the causes of barter a little more fully, focusing
on its political-economy, particularly in the Soviet Union, and to a lesser
degree in the LDCs. This formed the basis for the contention that barter had
a different future in the trade relations of the developed Western countries.
1
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the EBCs, and the LDCs.
The Western countries' market economies make it probable that while
price distortions and liquidity shortages may occur in the wake of crises,
there will be a tendency towards a rapid re- establishment of monetary trade.
The situation of the EBCs is dramatically different. There, a concern with
comprehensive planning has led the countries to impose a strict inconvert-
ibility on their currencies in order to prevent outsiders from exercising
any command over the domestic economies. Barter and clearing agreements were
then a solution to the liquidity and credit shortages that accompanied this
inconvertibility. The paper further argued that this situation was not likely
to change in the near future since the economic costs of inefficiency were
minor compared with the importance of the political goals. Therefore, one
could expect barter arrangements to continue as part of the trade relations
of the EBCs and even to grow in importance. The LDCs were described as
falling between the two extremes represented by the West and the EBCs. Here
though the problem was ascribed to overvalued exchange rates which had the
effect of taxing exports and subsidizing imports and thus distorting prices.
The discussion went on to suggest that barter opportunities would arise and
disappear as world demand for the LDCs' exports fell and rose, but around a
declining trendline as the development of the countries' economies and the
world financial markets worked to smooth export earnings.
While barter may seem, on the surface, strange and complex, the thrust
of this paper is that there is no reason for firms to fear entering into such
transactions. The mechanics are understandable and expert assistance is avail-
able from barter specialists. More importantly, the underlying causes are
themselves identifiable and understandable^. The author therefore hopes that
readers of this paper will have learnt to be alert to barter opportunities and
not to reject them out of hand.

Footnotes
1. Robert E. Weigand, "International Trade without Money," Harvard Business
Review , Nov. -Dec. 1977, p. 42.
2. Everett G. Martin, "U.S. Firms Are Pressed to Offer Barter Terras by
Overseas Customers," Wall Street Journal , May 18, 1977, p. 1+.
3. The Economist , Dec. 14, 1974, p. 53,
4. Weigand, Nov. -Dec. 1977, p. 29.
5. Business International S.A. , Solving East European Business Problems
(Geneva: Business International S.A. , 1977), p. 70.
6. Ibid., p. 69.
7. Ibid., p. 69.
8. Suzanne F. Porter, East West Trade Financing , U.S. Dept. of Commerce,
Domestic and International Business Administration, Bureau of East-West
Trade, Office of East-West Policy and Planning, 1976, p, 88.
9. Ibid., p. 89.
10. Weigand, Nov. -Dec. 1977, p. 29.
11. The Economist , "Have barter, will trade," Jan. 24, 1974, p.
12. The Economist , Dec. 14, 1974, p. 52.
13. John P. Morgan, "The Financial Aspects of East-West Trade," Columbia
Journal of World Business , Dec. 1973, p. 55.
14. Weigand, Nov. -Dec. 1977, p. 34.
15. Ibid., p. 38.
16. Business International , 1977, p. 70-71 and p. 90.
17. Ibid., p. 86.
18. Ibid., p. 85.
19. Jack Hirshleifer, Price Theory and Applications (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976), p. 268-269.
20. Business Week : "Barter deals cut the price of oil, "May 12, 1975, p. 30;
"Algeria tightens its oil-barter deals," Jun. 16, 1975, p. 24.
21. Ibid., "The Shah uses oil in intricate barters," Feb. 20, 1978, p. 40.
22. Herbert G. Grubel, The International Monetary System
,
(Baltimore:
Penguin Books Inc., 1969), p. 28.

23. William Nelson Turpin, Soviet Foreign Trade (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington
Books, D.C, Heath and Company, 1977), p. 80, He attributes the distinction
to Oscar Altman, "Russian Gold and the Ruble," IMF Staff Papers , Vol. VII
(1959-1960), pp. 430-435.
24. Rudiger Dornbusch, "The Theory of Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes and Macro-
economic Policy," Scandinavian Journal of Economics , Vol. 78, 1976, p. 270-
271.
25. Anthony Lanyi, "Separate Exchange Markets for Capital and Current Trans-
actions," International Monetary Fund Staff Papers , Nov. 1975, pp. 714-
749.
26. During a discussion of this subject, Donald R. Lessard suggested this point.
27. Klaus Bolz, "Compensation - Formula with Boomerang Effect," Intereconomics
,
No. 5/6, 1977, p. 114,
28. Turpin, 1977, Chapt. 7.
29. Ibid., p. 79.
30. Mark Allen, "The Structure and Reform of the Exchange and Payments Systems
of Some East European Countries," International Monetary Fund Staff Papers
,
Nov. 1976, pp. 718-739.
31. Bolz, No. 5/6, 1977, p. 113.
32. L.M. Goreux, "Compensatory Financing: The Cyclical Pattern of Export Short-
falls," International Monetary Fund Staff Papers
.
Nov. 1977, pp. 613-641.

Bibliography
Allen, Mark, "The Structure and Reform of the Exchange and Payments Systems
of Some East European Countries," International Monetary Fund Staff Papers
,
Nov. 1976, pp. 718-739.
Blackman, Courtney M. , "Making Reserves for Development," Columbia Journal of
World Business , Fall 1976, pp. 34-40.
Business International S.A., Solving East European Business Problems (Geneva:
Business International S„A. , 1977).
Business Week , "Algeria tightens its oil-barter deals," June 16, 1975, p. 25,
"Barter deals cut the price of oil," May 12, 1975, p. 30.
The Economist , "Business Brief: Back to barter," Dec. 14, 1974, pp. 52-53.
"Have barter, will trade," Jan. 24, 1976.
Bolz, Klaus, "Compensation- Formula with Boomerang Effect," I Intereconomics
,
No. 5/6, 1977, pp. 113-114.
Dornbusch, Rudiger, "The Theory of Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes and Macro-
economic Policy," Scandinavian Journal of Economics , Vol. 78, 1976, pp. 255-275.
Goreaux, L.M. , "Compensatory Financing: The Cyclical Pattern of Export Shortfalls,"
International Monetary Fund Staff Papers , Nov. 1977, pp. 613-641.
Grubel, Herbert G. , The International Monetary System (Baltimore: Penguin Books
Inc., 1969).
Hirshleifer, Jack, Price Theory and Applications (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976).
Industry Week
, "Bartering - when beans mean machines," Mar. 28, 1977, pp. 78-80.
Lanyi, Anthony, "Separate Exchange Markets for Capital and Current Transactions,"
International Monetary Fund Staff Papers , Nov, 1975, pp. 714-749.
Martin, Everett G. , "U.S. Firms Are Pressed to Offer Barter Terms by Overseas
Customers," Wall Street Journal , May 18, 1977, p. 1+.
Morgan, John P., "The Financial Aspects of East-West Trade," Columbia Journal
of World Business , Dec. 1973, pp. 51-56.
Porter, Suzanne F. , East West Trade Financing , U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Domestic
and International Business Administration, Bureau of East-West Trade, Office
of East-West Policy and Planning, 1976,
Turpin, William Nelson, Soviet Foreign Trade (Lexington, Mass,: Lexington Books,
D.C. Heath and Company, 1977).
Weigand, Robert E., "International Trade without Money," Harvard Business Review
,
Nov. -Dec. 1977, p, 27+.


BASEMENT
Date Due
OEC 5 "83
NOV 13
APR 11198E
OCT
'
m. ^'-^ ^^'
Lib-26-67
-4'^)yie.
1
MAR 4 1983
HD28.IV1414 no.994- 78
Van Breda, M. /A reconciliation of som
734902 0»BKS 00055087
3 TDSD DOl D71 DD7
HD28.M414 no.995- 78
/A possible design and e
734900 D*BKS 0005524?
3 TDfiD 001 073 13b
HD28.M414 no.996- 78
Tschoegl, Adri/lnternational barter /
734898 D»BKS. 0"
3 TOflO 001 071 05b
HD28.M414 nD.997- 78
Mason, Scott P/Risky debt, lump proces
735063..
.
_D»BKS 000577
'? D»B
3 TOflO 001 lOM 121
HD28.IV1414 no.998- 78
Kobrin, Stephe/Political risk :
745187 D»BKS 00143304
3 TOflO 002 130 M71
HD28.M414 no.999- 78
Holland, Dame/Trends in corporate pro
735081 D»BKS 0005778"
3 TOflO 001 103 TES
if

